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Abstract 
This article makes a dual contribution to scholarship in science and technology studies 
(STS) on simulation-building. It both documents a specific simulation-building project, and 
demonstrates a concrete contribution to interdisciplinary work of STS insights. The article 
analyses the struggles that arise in the course of determining what counts as theory, as model 
and even as a simulation. Such debates are especially decisive when working across 
disciplinary boundaries, and their resolution is an important part of the work involved in 
building simulations. In particular, we show how ontological arguments about the value of 
simulations tend to determine the direction of simulation-building. This dynamic makes it 
difficult to maintain an interest in the heterogeneity of simulations and a view of simulations 
as unfolding scientific objects. 
As an outcome of our analysis of the process and reflections about interdisciplinary 
work around simulations, we propose a chart, as a tool to facilitate discussions about 
simulations. This chart can be a means to create common ground among actors in a 
simulation-building project, and a support for discussions that address other features of 
simulations besides their ontological status. Rather than foregrounding the chart’s 
classificatory potential, we stress its (past and potential) role in discussing and reflecting on 
simulation-building as interdisciplinary endeavor. This chart is a concrete instance of the 
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kinds of contributions that STS can make to better, more reflexive practice of simulation-
building. 
 
 
Ambitions and Struggles in Building Simulations 
 Could a simulation be based on the rich insights that come out of ethnographic 
fieldwork? What if some aspects of fieldwork could be represented in a radically different 
way? What if people’s ability to learn and act in new ways could be modeled? These three 
very different questions came together six years ago, and fuelled a research proposal. The 
contrasts between these starting points were significant, and they were clear to us from the 
beginning. We indeed expected challenges and negotiations during the project. What we 
didn’t expect though, was that in the course of building a simulation, we would end up with a 
whole hard drive full of them! Nor did we envisage that we would so strongly disagree about 
what counted as proper simulations. One participant’s simulation was another participant’s 
game. One researcher’s sound underlying model was another’s unacceptable reduction. We 
therefore ended up with a wealth of simulations in different stages of development, which 
were furthermore very unevenly appreciated within the team.  Most importantly, however, we 
also developed ways to exchange about and understand these differences. We use the notion 
of “simulation-building” in this paper to point to the process of creating simulation tools, 
some of which were made publicly available. This process entails discussion and negotiation 
about conceptualization, theoretical model-building, the development of mathematical 
models, numerical methods to explore them, and, eventually building interfaces that allow 
users to engage with simulations. 
 This article explores these expected and unexpected tensions in simulation-building, 
in order to make a dual contribution. First, what follows is a reflection on the process of 
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simulation-building, and contributes to STS scholarship on simulation in scientific research. 
Simulation, as a practice, is receiving more attention of late, but case studies of this kind, 
documenting a specific simulation building project, remain scarce. Second, this account is 
used to articulate a concrete contribution that STS scholarship can make to simulation-
building. As an outcome of our analysis of and reflections about the process, we propose a 
chart, as a tool to facilitate discussions about simulations. This tool, we will show, can be a 
means to create common ground among actors in a simulation-building project, and 
constitutes an effective deployment of STS insights. Rather than foregrounding its 
classificatory potential, we want to highlight its function as a support for discussing and 
reflecting on simulation-building as interdisciplinary endeavors. 
Two accounts are therefore entwined in this article. We present the struggles that 
arose in the course of the project, and make explicit the tools, vocabularies and practices we 
developed to work through them. We want to show that what counts as theory, as model, and 
as simulation are part of the important work involved in building simulations. We further 
demonstrate how a chart can help make explicit ‘what counts’ for both scholars and builders 
of simulation. By conjoining these two perspectives in this article, we wish to link 
simulation-building and analysis as a kind of STS-on-the-ground, a position that we want to 
clarify and distinguish from a positivistic approach that dominates much simulation-building 
efforts. But before detailing the simulation-building case and explaining how the chart came 
about, we describe some of the background of the project and of this article.  
 
The Competence Project 
The simulation-building project aimed to explore a model of learning, the 
‘competence model’. This ‘competence model’ has been the object of publications in 
education and management theory, as part of a larger debate around life-long learning and the 
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role of professional education in Germany (Erpenbeck & Heyse, 1999). Here “model” refers 
to a theoretical framework, rooted in philosophy and psychology, in which four types of 
competences have been proposed as most important for human behavior in processes of 
problem solving and learning: personality, social-communicative competences, knowledge 
(factual), and activity (as the impetus to act). Empirically operationalised in the form of a 
questionnaire, the approach had been tested in corporate settings, as a tool for self- and 
external evaluation. Erpenbeck, the main proponent of this body of work was aiming to link 
this conceptual framework to mathematical models of complex systems. This may not seem 
to be an obvious link. However, problem solving has been a topic of research for areas like 
operations research, engineering and design—all areas where mathematical models are 
dominant. In this approach, problem solving conceptualized as finding the ‘optimum’ point. 
Extending this concept with a spatial metaphor, solving a problem would be finding the 
highest point in a space, and learning could be described as seeking such a ‘high’ location. 
Mathematical models can be used to describe such optimum points, and to describe strategies 
to reach these high points. Furthermore, attributes that affect learning can also be expressed 
as part of a mathematical model—what we will refer to as ‘knowledge spaces’ later on. When 
applying such an approach to a theory of learning, it is possible to use a mathematical model 
to describe a situation (what can be learned) and an actor’s behaviour (how one learns). These 
are the elements needed to produce a spatial rendering, in the shape of a simulation. When 
building a simulation within such a space, the behaviour of actors can further be modeled on 
‘searching’ strategies, which are rendered as the exploration of a space. These strategies can 
be more or less complex, depending on the attributes of agents (for example, all-seeing or 
having limited vision) and the complexity of the space (one optimum point, or several ‘hills’). 
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Often, search strategies are described using elements from evolutionary theories. Computing 
is used to handle the underlying mathematical models, and to visualise the outcomes of 
computation into a spatial simulation on a screen.  
To return to the goals of our project, Erpenbeck hoped that social-psychological  
models of competence could also be enhanced by linking and translating them into 
mathematical models, like those used to conceptualize learning as a process of problem 
solving and optimizing. He further hoped that simulations could help users learn about and 
engage with notions of ‘competences’ in problem solving situations. He was aware of the 
work of two ‘simulation-builders’ (Andrea Scharnhorst and Werner Ebeling), and suggested 
that their specific  model approach could be the basis for a simulation. The heuristic potential 
of models to explain phenomena by assuming a specific set of mechanisms would involve 
various trade-offs, but it would also hold the advantage of providing a representation with 
which researchers could explore complex relationships over time. The input to the 
competence project from Erpenbeck was therefore a body of knowledge about learning, in 
which learning was specified according to a number of dimensions (‘competences’).   
 The core of the simulation-building team was a duo of scholars (Scharnhorst and 
Ebeling), both trained as physicists, and experienced in the development of various models 
and simulations. One of them (Scharnhorst) had applied conceptual and formal elements of 
models to social sciences such as describing technological innovations or the emergence of 
new ideas. Following their contacts with Erpenbeck, and convinced of the feasibility of such 
a simulation, they recruited a programmer (Thomas Huesing) who was to program the 
simulation and design the interface, and an ethnographer (Anne Beaulieu), a colleague of 
Scharnhorst, who had experience in doing ethnographic work in situations such as 
laboratories, where learning is an important activity. At this point, the project’s aims 
multiplied. For the programmer, this was an interesting and challenging job that might 
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contribute to his portfolio of expertise. The presence of the ethnographer added a challenge of 
interdisciplinary work and novelty for all parties. For the physicists on the team, this was an 
opportunity to explore how their models might be used to convey a social behavior such as 
learning. At a later point, when the competence project had pretty much run its course, 
another project around simulations was developing in one of the institutions involved. Matt 
Ratto, trained as an STS researcher, was the main researchers for this project, and joined in 
on some of the conversations about the troubled history of the competence project. In trying 
to recount our many attempts at building a satisfactory simulation to Matt, the various stories 
we told and the ways in which our accounts contrasted made clear that there were major 
tensions in the ways we understood the simulations. We recount and illustrate below various 
efforts to build simulations, and relate them to actors’ epistemic commitments (Ratto, 2006). 
In the course of discussions between the three authors of this article, a ‘back of the 
envelope’ sketch began to take form, as a way of recounting the many efforts in building 
simulations in the competence project. Sketching enabled us to make sense of the ways in 
which we disagreed. It also helped us identify the past and present disagreement as variously 
addressing the meaning, purpose, validity or potential use of simulations. We use our 
experience to demonstrate the importance of articulating such differences in order to specify 
and resolve them—or at least, to agree on what we disagree about! The potential of such a 
chart for developing and putting STS insights to use is explained in the last part of this article.  
We first consider the kinds of questions that have been raised by researchers around 
simulation-building, in order to articulate the value of analyzing this area of scientific 
practice and the potential contributions of science and technology studies to the field of 
simulations. 
 
 
7	  
	  
Simulation as Practice 
The characterization of simulation as a particular kind of scientific output has 
occupied a number of scholars. Interesting discussions have been pursued, as to whether 
simulations should be considered as scientific experiments, as scientific theories, or as hybrid 
forms that share features of both concepts, having both a normative and empirical character 
(Lenhard, Kueppers & Shinn, 2006; Merz & Knuttila, 2006). Many kinds of work can be 
labeled ‘simulations’, but generally speaking, a simulation is a partial re-creation of a 
phenomenon. The phenomena can be recreated through the use of a mathematical model that 
represents it, but it can also be re-enacted, for example through simulation of behavior in 
form of games, including war games and role playing. More attention has also been paid 
recently to practices around simulation and to simulation-building, shifting the view of 
simulation, from output to process. Ghamari-Tabrizi’s work on the development of war-game 
simulations in the United States demonstrates that running simulations resulted in a special 
kind of knowledge, grounded in the lived experience of participants rather than in the end-
product (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2000). Similarly, this article documents insights we developed in 
the course of simulation-building--related to the simulation, but distinct from the 
‘deliverables’ of the project. Focusing on practices also provides insight into the dynamics 
that shape simulations.  Ontological discussions are especially prominent in the building of 
simulations. (Sundberg, 2006)  
In our project there was an appeal to physics, and more specifically, to complexity theory. 
We will describe these interactions at greater length below, but for now, it is interesting to 
note that appealing to the physics in our discussions meant asserting the primacy of a 
mathematical description (an equation). This formulation of a phenomenon was argued to be 
the most precise and scientific basis for building a simulation. Another study of simulations  
in nanotechnology (Johnson, 2006), also highlights that if simulations are derived from 
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‘calculations’, from ‘first principles’, they are considered particularly valuable. Importantly, 
however, Johnson’s analysis reveals that, when considered in terms of the contextual practice 
of simulation-building, simulations are best understood as hybrids that are not simply or 
purely extensions of calculations from models.1  
While our focus on simulation-building as a practice also emphasizes simulation-
building as a chain of heterogeneous processes (Merz and Knuttila, 2006), it would seem that 
the appeal to an ontological rock bottom is not unique to our experience. If we are to consider 
that simulations ‘allow actors to hold different conceptions of the same artifact and serve 
multiple purpose’ and characterize them as ‘unfolding scientific objects’(Merz and Knuttila, 
2006: 6),  the strength of ontological rhetoric stands in the way of productive discussions 
about the heterogeneity of simulation-building and about the value of this diversity. This is 
all the more important because public perceptions of models also distinguish between 
multiple aspects of models and their functioning (Yearly, 1999). In a setting where public 
debates increasingly involve models and simulations (Edwards, 1999), understanding and 
articulating this heterogeneity becomes an important contribution to the politics of 
knowledge. Debates about the value of various simulations shape simulations as sites where 
different practices intersect and where different epistemic cultures meet (Galison, 1997; 
Lenhard, Kueppers & Shinn, 2006). But again, this multiplicity was not always so easy to 
articulate as a positive quality of simulations. Our process was marked by struggles for purity 
of form and purpose of simulations, and the diversity of simulations was seen as wasting 
time. If we are to understand simulation as practice and simulation as a site of diversity and 
heterogeneity, we must also understand the effect of these appeals to the physics, and the 
dominance of ontological discussions. 
In what follows, we extend the scholarship on these issues by contextualizing these 
arguments and exploring the implications of ontological discussions in the process of 
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simulation building. Our contribution is therefore germane to the various critiques of 
simulations that highlight how certain elements may be erased and others privileged in the 
building of simulation (Helmreich, 2000a).  Because we also participated in simulation-
building, we are in a privileged position to experience and develop a reflexive stance to 
simulation building. This is not an easy task.  If, as Lansing notes, ‘many anthropologists 
continue to associate any use of mathematics with a simplistic positivism’ (Lansing, 2000: 
317), we found that many physicists associate verbal description with imprecision, 
superficiality and an inherently ad hoc relation to ‘reality’. Other STS scholars have also 
noted that it can be difficult to exchange with model-builders about the assumptions on which 
their simulations or models are built. Lahsen repeatedly signals this issue in her analysis of 
climate model builders (Lahsen, 2005). She also highlights that while other scholars also 
have potentially valuable and useful contributions to make to the development of simulation, 
modelers may not be open to these insights (Lahsen, 2005). Our goal in what follows is 
therefore is to show how particular emphasis and assumptions in simulation building arise, 
and how an STS sensibility led us to develop concrete ways of intervening in simulation-
building. 
 
How We Set out to Simulate Competences and Learning 
From 2003 to 2005, two of the authors (Scharnhorst and Beaulieu) worked in a 
project together with a physicist and a computer programmer. The ‘competence project’, as 
they grew to call it, was a basic research project meant to inform transformation in the 
understanding and organization of professional education in Germany. The work was framed 
by a policy-driven demand for a better understanding of how learning and individual worker 
development takes place within a knowledge economy. Rather than focus on the role of static 
qualifications and skills, the project explored a dynamic notion of competence, and developed 
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simulations around this notion. But besides the explicit goal of developing a simulation to 
represent this notion of competence that was at the forefront of this project, other agendas 
were also active in shaping interactions during the simulation-building.  For Beaulieu and 
Scharnhorst, this was also an opportunity to explore the interdisciplinary challenge of relating 
ethnographic observations and simulations.  Another element appealed to Scharnhorst and 
other team members. In the education science framework of the project, competences are 
conceptualized as dispositions for self-organized learning (Erpenbeck, 1996; Erpenbeck & 
Rosentiel 2003). For the physicists in the team, this notion of self-organized learning seemed 
germane to physics’ theories of self-organization.2 Because elements like ‘uncertainty’ and 
collective behavior are central to self-organization theory and to discussions about learning 
and development,3 to the physicists, this seemed like a promising conceptual connection. It 
would support the translation of Erpenbeck’s notions of learning and competence into 
simulations based on mathematical models of self-organization with which the physicists 
were familiar. From this starting point, it seemed to the physicists that the initial task was to 
develop mathematical models that would incorporate the role of competences in the process 
of learning, and render the emergence of a self-organizing order.  
To transform the framework developed by Erpenbeck and others into a simulation, a 
number of translations were necessary. In some areas of social science, it is quite common to 
define behaviors in terms of aspects or features, and this is also the case for Erpenbeck’s 
work. The components of learning (competences and motivations) are described as features, 
which can be measured according to a questionnaire (also developed by Erpenbeck and 
colleagues). In contrast to the form of questionnaires and scores, however, the kinds of 
simulations envisaged were fundamentally spatial. A major translation, therefore, was to 
transform the scores on each of the relevant features into a spatial representation. In figure 1, 
we see how scores obtained via a questionnaire can be visualized by means of a spider 
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diagram. The scores for particular features, as ascertained through the questionnaire, are 
represented as points on the vectors P, A, S and K. 
 
  
Figure 1: A space for measuring 4 competences (P, A, S, K). The dashed lines link the scores of an 
individual in a specific situation. The quantitative scores are thereby rendered spatially. The shape made 
up by the lines corresponds to particular configurations, which may be more or less favorable to learning. 
 
A chain is therefore established between concept and spatial representation. In the 
‘competence space’ each point represents the actual use of certain competences, and when 
combined, represent a preferred combination of competences. In the process of learning one 
can assume that this use pattern changes-- for individuals as well as for the whole group. 
Trajectories in this space therefore show the development of competences. This 
representation offers the possibility of building further, more complex representations using a 
mathematical framework. Via the manipulation of points in a space that have come to stand 
for competences that support ‘learning’, mathematical modeling can be linked to behavior.  
Once the concepts had been given form in a spatial representation, the team’s initial 
extension of this framework was to transform the static visualization of individual 
competences are transformed  into a more dynamic visual form that encompassed different 
P	   	   Competence	  Measurement	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  
K	   S	  
favorable	  situation	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
unfavorable	  situation	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configurations (‘scores’) that change over time.  Changes in competences could thus be 
visualized as motion or travel through a landscape where the hills represent “optimal” 
combinations of competences. When different “searchers” gather together around one peak 
this means that a certain type of competence spectrum is favored in the group. The 
competence space represents the development of individual and group skills.  The simulation 
can also be used to show the use of skills and competences to solve certain problem. In this 
second translation, the competences become mechanisms instead of attributes. The new 
attributes are features of problems and ideas, and form a problem space. In such an abstract 
problem space, each location corresponds to a certain state of knowledge reached, or a 
specific problem solution. Travelling through this space corresponds to the search for new 
solutions and new ideas (Bruckner et al 1990; Scharnhorst 2001; Weisberg, Muldoon 2009), 
innovations that could potentially be empirically measured (Scharnhorst 1999).  
For the purposes of our discussion here, it is important to note that the formulation 
‘agents searching in an abstract landscape can be used to associate the topic to be investigated 
with a specific genre of simulations.   
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Figure 2: This figure shows the transformation of one kind of representation into another. The scores 
(measurement of competences) along 4 dimensions (small figure in upper left corner) are transformed 
into points on a landscape (shown from side and top view).  In the simulation, individuals travel in these 
landscapes. 
 
The result is a simulation of individuals experiencing different situations over time, learning 
or not. The positive consequences of learning are represented as being able to find and climb 
the hills in the landscape. Referring to our title, this is ‘learning in a landscape’ in a first 
sense: we translated and represented learning into a simulation, which takes the shape of 
traveling through a landscape.   
Starting from the phrasing of competence development as ‘travel’ and moving to the 
use of competences as instruments for problem solving, the modelers in the team explored the 
possible mathematical equations and algorithms that could be used to describe the dynamics 
of movement in a landscape. 
 
 
P	   	   Competence	  
Measurement	   	  	  	  	  	  A	  
K	  
S	  
favourable	  situation	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
unfavourable	  situation	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What about ethnography? 
Translations are at the core of building simulations, and many other translations and 
elaborations had to be specified. But one element that had fallen by the wayside by this point 
was the idea that ethnographic fieldwork might ‘feed’ the simulations. Simulation building, 
as a practice, was in large part a question of anchoring particular aspects of the simulation to 
features of the behavior to be modeled and to various formal models. It was assumed at the 
beginning of the project that the role of the ethnographer would be to bring ethnographic 
observations about competence and professional development into the simulation project. 
Because there was so little experience on the part of the ethnographer with the practice of 
simulation building, and equally little familiarity with ethnography on the part of the 
simulation builders, discussions about possible interactions between ethnographic accounts of 
competence and formal models proceeded like parallel soliloquies.  
What happened next will not be much of a surprise to those familiar with laboratory 
studies, but came as a rather big and not altogether welcome surprise to the simulation 
builders: the ethnographer turned her attention to the simulations building team. Questions 
like ‘what is the agency of your agent-based model?’ or ‘what are you trying to represent 
with the time dimension?’ came up (as in Eglash (1997)), but perhaps most persistent and 
recurrent were questions about why certain simulations were considered ‘ good’  or 
successful, and therefore pursued, and why others were abandoned in the very early stages of 
development.  The assumptions that were part of the spatial representation were also 
critiqued--Why should there be a space? Why should that space be finite? Etc. At times, these 
questions exacerbated tensions that were already present among members of the project team. 
What eventually became a fascinating exploration was, for quite a long time, a set of 
uncomfortable tensions and mounting disagreements. These conversations triggered lasting 
debates about the different ways of using computer simulations and representing results. 
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Graphs, videos, interactive game interfaces, visualizations in the form of drawings, and little 
animated digital images were all eventually used to facilitate communication between 
members of the project team. 
 
The Simulations We Built 
We provide illustrations of just three of the many simulations that were subsequently 
built. We chose these because they are most indicative of the work accomplished and of the 
debates that animated the project. This messiness of the simulation-making process in the 
project represents, among other things, the complexity of the debate inside the project team. 
While we present them here as a somewhat linear sequence of events, for the team at that 
time, the simulations did not emerge progressively. The actual process was in fact, a much 
more layered, interwoven experience that included loose ends and false starts. As is the case 
with all representations, this article is a selective, purposive and constitutive account, and one 
that may become part of varied practices.  
The labels given to these selected simulations will be more meaningful to some, but 
their contrasting appearance should provide readers without much familiarity with particular 
schools of modeling with a sense of their dissimilarity. A brief overview of the tensions 
between the different evaluations of the material is provided for each simulation.  
 
Swarm simulation 
Swarm models are a favorite tool in complexity theory, are used to model the 
(coordinated) behavior of a large number of elements (i.e. particles or individuals in 
populations). We use the term ‘swarm’ to label a numerical algorithm that solves a set of 
mathematical equations and to refer to its visualization as a swarming movement. Building on 
work done by Scharnhorst and colleagues, the simulation was developed using a specific 
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framework for modeling self-organizing processes called ‘geometrically-oriented 
evolutionary theory’.  This means that the rules of interaction between agents and landscape 
are inspired by evolutionary concepts, like adaptation and survival.  The movements of 
agents in the landscape are in turn specified using mathematical equations. The resulting 
visualization shows agents moving around in a landscape, so that the movement of agents has 
the appearance of a ‘swarm’, much like that of a swarm of bees.  These kinds of simulations 
are typically used to illustrate emerging group behavior in a complex system. The simulation 
can be run countless times, and its outcomes can be statistically analyzed.  With this 
simulation, we wanted to see how agents would move from one part of the landscape to the 
other, from one hill to the next. By changing the parameters that represent the use of 
competences such as communication or factual knowledge, movement through the landscape 
could be more or less rapid. Despite the complexity of the underlying mathematical model, 
this simulation resulted in a somewhat uninspiring visualization. (See figure 3). Most agents 
finally reached the new maximum in the upper right corner.  
 
               
Figure 3: A top view of the landscape, with hills indicated by contour lines. Agents are shown as small 
dots. The two screenshots (displayed side by side) show the simulation at two different points in time. 
	  
Some members of the team felt that this simulation successfully incorporated and 
represented the complexity of the relationships between competences, and between 
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competences and performance, at the level of the underlying model and equations. But little 
of this sophistication was visible to those unfamiliar with this particular class of mathematical 
models. While the relationship between the notion of competence and the model underlying 
the simulation were satisfyingly sophisticated, nearly all other elements of this simulation 
were disappointing. The result was a visually boring simulation, with points moving in a 
seemingly trivial manner. If part of the value of using simulations in this project was to 
engage researchers to think through complex interactions and to support heuristic 
explorations, this simulation wasn’t successful on those counts.  Furthermore, specialist 
programming knowledge, including elements of Fortran and of Linux operating systems, 
were needed to run the simulation, to change the parameters for agents and to turn the output 
data file into a video sequence. This further restricted the usability of the simulation. 
 
Metaphorical simulation 
Following this experience, the team member responsible for computer programming 
of the simulations took it upon himself to develop a visualization that would better illustrate 
the main concepts of the competence model. His aim was to create a visualization that would 
show how competences developed as agents moved between spheres of experience and 
competence. He also aimed to build a simulation that would be much more interactive than 
the earlier one, and that would engage users in the exploration of the concepts involved. 
This simulation also involved a landscape. The movement of agents, however, was 
guided by ‘rules’ rather than by the solving of an equation. The behavior of the agents was 
rather derived from a verbal description.  In this simulation, two large circles represented two 
different areas of experience. Agents, shown as small circles, first move within the first large 
circle of experience and eventually travel to the other large circle. The motion of agents is 
defined according to the impetus each agent derives from its competences. 
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The result was much more interactive than the swarm simulation. The user could 
change the number of agents, adjust the level of competences and therefore affect the patterns 
of travel from one circle to the other. The distance between the circles could also be changed, 
so as to make travel more or less likely (see figure 4). The support for this simulation was 
Shockwave Flash, a well-known software suite for web-based animations.  
 
Figure 4: Snapshot from a run of the interactive ‘metaphorical simulation’.  Agents are shown as small 
circles with a nucleus. The two spheres of experience can be seen: the starting sphere is on the left, and 
agents move from this sphere towards the one on the right. 
 
Within the team, reactions to this simulation were as strong as they were diverse. 
Because it did not rely on the specific kind of equation chosen by the physicists, was an 
initial reaction was to dismiss it out of hand as inadequate. While it did illustrate important 
features of Erpenbeck’s competence theory, its reliance on verbal and conceptual models 
made it difficult to accept. At best, the physicists argued, we could accept this simulation as a 
‘game’, or as a metaphorical simulation. These terms point to the analogical rather than 
formally-defined (mathematically-defined) relation between the simulation and underlying 
19	  
	  
model. It was eventually deemed acceptable as an intermediary step towards the possibility of 
creating an interactive simulation. This was largely due to its form, which opened up the 
simulation to a non-programming type of interaction with the user, and due to the fact that 
this simulation made elements of ‘competence’ more explicit than the swarm simulation.  
The metaphoric simulation, in spite —or because— of all the many ways in which it 
was heretical to the equation-based style of modeling, did open up the discussion to other 
aspects of simulations. Elements like visual richness, diversity of users, and the exploration 
of the notion of competence (rather than its being set in stone in terms of its relation to an 
equation) became important themes of discussion. In the course of these discussions, the 
team’s understanding of simulation also shifted. Rather than seeing simulations as a tool in 
the service of mathematical theories, the simulations came to be regarded as objects in and of 
themselves, with significant potential for communicating ideas and concepts. From this point, 
a greater range of simulation-building strategies were pursued. The metaphoric simulation 
redirected some of the work towards more interactive forms. Others, feeling that the relation 
between the set of rules underlying the metaphoric simulation were too arbitrary and vague, 
returned to complex equations. They did so however, having experienced that more 
interactive set ups for simulations had advantages.  
 
Evolino, a Behavioral Simulation 
 In this third simulation, the team brought together elements of earlier simulations. The 
evolutionary model reappeared, with hills and valleys indicating possible situations, while the 
behavior of agents was made much more explicitly visible and manipulable.  This simulation 
enabled users to play out different scenarios by changing the competences of agents, or by 
changing the kinds of interactions between group members. In running the simulation, the 
user could therefore explore how certain relations between individual competences and group 
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processes could alter movement in the landscape. As such, the heuristic possibilities of this 
simulation were quite high. It seemed to have greater potential for experimenting, rather than 
solely for demonstrating or visualizing. This version made it possible to play out a situation 
in which certain types of competence would be highly influential, and to observe the 
individual and group effects on learning as an outcome.  
  
 
Figure 5: A screenshot of the Evolino simulation. The variation in the landscape is indicated by shades of 
blue (grey in this reproduction), with darker areas indicating higher peaks. At the beginning of a run, 
agents are located at the second lowest of the three peaks, in the bottom left-hand corner. The ‘goal’, 
again, is to find the higher hill in the upper right-hand corner. The challenge for this dynamic process is 
to cross the valley between the hills. 
	  
Another Strand of the Story: Reflecting on Simulation Building 
In the story just told, the research team was tasked with simulating competence and 
learning, and decided to begin by using mathematical models of evolution, coupled to the 
metaphor of agents searching across an unknown landscape. The team first created a 
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mathematical model and solved it through the use of stochastic differential equations, 
outputting the results as a form of swarm dynamics. Deciding this was neither illustrative 
enough nor sufficiently user-friendly for non-experts, they then used the concepts – but not 
the mathematics – to code an animated game-like simulation. At a later stage, because of 
critiques that this last simulation was more of a game than a scientific tool, the team created 
an interactive simulation that operationalized the concepts through a set of rule-based 
behavior based explicitly on the evolutionary mathematics, but with a user-friendly graphic 
cellular automata format. 
 If we left it there, this would seem to be a straightforward process; the first 
simulation was explicitly based in proven evolutionary mathematics and therefore carried 
ontological weight, but was not interactive or ‘representationally rich’ enough for non-
experts; the second simulation, while ‘representationally rich’, had only a loose or 
‘metaphoric’ connection to the mathematics and therefore was ontologically poor; the 
combination of these two approaches resulted in the third simulation, one with express links 
to the mathematics (ontologically rich,) as well as an interactive, and game-like interface 
(accessible to non-experts). Taken in this way, the story is also reminiscent of Goldilocks’ 
experience with the three bears’ porridge –too hot, too cold, just right - and equally a fable.    
The actual project was much messier, and, in point of fact, many other simulation 
prototypes were partially developed and abandoned for various reasons. Several never even 
reached the eyes of all members of the team. The three simulations detailed above were in 
fact never considered as ‘equal’ or part of an overall trajectory – that came with the writing of 
this article. Each simulation served different and not altogether commensurate purposes 
inside the research team. The first was used to ‘play around’ with solutions of mathematical 
equations in order to discover surprising effects; the second served as a way of convincing 
members of the team of the need for a more visually rich experience; the third was the means 
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for exploring the creation of simulations that allowed users to discover new perspectives on 
competence. Moreover, as the simulations developed, the initial perspectives shifted. For 
example, in the course of the project, the team described the various competence types as 
both targets of evolutionary processes (in the numerical and metaphoric simulations) and as 
accompanying mechanisms within learning processes (Evolino). The simulations thus 
reflected heterogeneity (within the team and over time) about the underlying theories and 
models, rather than being the result of a purely linear trajectory of trial and error that 
necessarily resulted, eventually, in the ‘best’ simulation.   
 Not surprisingly, there is a close connection between the disciplinary backgrounds and 
experience of each researcher, and their evaluation of each simulation. The theories of 
competence and learning, for example, were based on those developed by the philosopher 
and psychologist (Erpenbeck) who was coordinating the grant framework which funded this 
work. The physicists (Ebeling and Scharnhorst) had previous experience in modeling 
evolutionary search processes, using stochastic differential equations, and developing 
simulations that relied on ‘fitness landscapes.’ Also trained in social sciences and philosophy 
of science, one member had experiences in tailoring models towards social theories 
(Scharnhorst, 2001). The computer programmer (Huesing) had experience developing 
interactive ‘games’ and programming user-oriented software. All participants reflected on the 
relationships, models, and theories promulgated in the project, but the more STS oriented 
participant (Ratto and Beaulieu) brought a specific critical focus to reflections about 
disciplinary differences and representational idioms. These differences fuelled the variety of 
simulations described above, and disagreements remained as to the value of each one of 
them.  
 For example, the physicists in the project believed that the swarm dynamics 
simulation was the richest representation of the underlying self-organizing principles they felt 
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governed competences and learning. This simulation was seen as better because of the way it 
appeared to make direct use of the formal mathematical model,4 rather than relying on 
informal articulations of the concepts or principles that the model was supposed to express. 
However, the computer programmer and the ethnographer both expressed doubts about the 
results generated by the simulation and failed to understand them as representing important 
new insights. They argued that lack of transparency and certain unquestioned assumption 
seriously limited the simulation, and that mathematical determinism was at play. Equally, 
since the functioning of the metaphoric simulation involved the programmer’s own ad-hoc 
translation of the competence concepts into computer code, this lack of direct connection to 
the mathematical model was seen as limiting its applicability. The physicists therefore felt 
that the behavior of the agents in the metaphorical simulation were neither true to a 
mathematical model, nor to the evolutionary dynamics that were supposed to be represented 
by this mathematical model. The validity of the simulation was therefore tightly connected to 
the use of numerical algorithms. 
 This connection between validity and numeric algorithms also fostered the physicists’ 
apprehension about what came to be called the ‘rule-based’ simulation, Evolino. Evolino was 
seen as a specific numeric translation of the swarm dynamics algorithm into a discrete grid-
based game. By taking the different evolutionary functions articulated mathematically in the 
equations (namely selection, mutation and imitation,) and creating specific corresponding 
agent rules based upon these functions, members of the team felt the link to evolutionary 
dynamics would be clearer, thereby increasing the validity of the simulation. Evolino 
therefore had a more complex articulation of its basic assumptions – from mathematics to 
rules. It thus claimed most of the validity of the swarm simulation mathematics, with the 
added value of being an illustrative device for non-physicists.5 However, to some members of 
the team, Evolino, like the metaphoric simulation, remained a ‘translation’ of the more formal 
24	  
	  
swarm simulation-- less valid, but necessary for the further circulation of the original 
concepts, theories, and ideas. 
 
From a Back of the Envelope Sketch to a ‘Chart’ 
This analysis of the experience of the research team highlights the importance of the 
histories, ways of working and material resources of makers of simulations. These must be 
taken into account in order to understand where simulations come from and how they are 
valued. Equally, our experiences have made us very aware of the dangers of too simple a 
story and the reductive nature of a linear trajectory of development. These are important 
points to make about the practice of simulation-building, and the insights gained have shaped 
our approach to simulations in subsequent projects. In conjunction with our reflections on our 
teams’ debates, another type of outcome took shape. A recurring motif in our reflections and 
negotiations was a ‘landscape of simulations’, which first appeared as a back of the envelope 
sketch, and later as a chart (illustrated below). We used this representation in various, 
increasingly sophisticated forms, in order to articulate tensions and to focus particular debates 
within the team and between the authors.  
As will be clear by now, a key tension characterized the process of simulation-
building across the many episodes of the project. On one hand, many different simulations 
were sketched and elaborated (to different degrees). On the other hand, there was an almost 
overwhelming tendency to evaluate simulations on an ontological level, in terms of their 
relationship to a foundational model. As we discussed earlier, if this relationship could be 
articulated in terms of a mathematical equation, the value of the simulation was considered to 
be safeguarded, and simulations could proceed from that solid starting point. However, other 
simulations were differently conceived and articulated, with eventually fruitful consequences 
for the project. But we found that the golden standard of the ‘truth’ of simulation was very 
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difficult to denaturalize. We repeatedly faced appeals to ‘first principles’--an appeal to the 
physics that has also been observed by other scholars, as noted above. Our simple sketch 
started out as a way to make explicit which criteria were being used to evaluate a simulation. 
Drawing and labeling the axes demanded articulation of the criteria according to which 
simulations were being evaluated. 
The sketch, which developed into something like the figure below (see figure 6), 
served the purpose of shifting the discussion from ‘this simulation is better,’ to ‘this 
simulation is better in terms of X or Y.’ For example, the version of the chart below shows an 
x axis that makes explicit a tension between ways of linking models and simulations. The 
sketch did not magically resolve tensions.  But it appeared more and more frequently, and 
became a way of articulating differences between simulations—differences relative to a 
specific criterion that was made explicit through consensus about labels.  
  
 
Figure 6: The various simulations produced in the competence project are placed on the chart, in relation 
to two axes. The y axis represents the purpose of a simulation, while the x axis represents the methods of 
description for the model underlying the simulation. 
	  
In this project, the dimension of formal/informal  appeared especially frequently, as the way 
to articulate (and open up to debate) the ontological hierarchy that was at work in assigning 
FORMAL 
explicit, hard rules 
EVOLINO 
SWARM SIMULATION 
METAPHORICAL 
SIMULATION 
 
INFORMAL 
tacit, soft rules 
CONCEPTS 
PHENOMENON 
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greater value to simulations based on mathematical models (equations) than to simulations 
based on concepts (verbal descriptions). This particular label is the object of a fragile 
consensus, and still the object of discussion in the writing of the final version of this text.  
But it is neither the normative nor finalized status of this chart that is significant. 
Rather, it is the way the chart enables the articulation of the criteria for evaluation. This is 
learning in a landscape in a second sense: in developing this representation of simulations in 
a landscape, we learned to better debate simulations. It was at times a great struggle to 
establish that certain simulations could be better according to certain criteria, or be better-
suited for certain purposes. The need to make assumptions explicit is not always equally felt 
by all team members, and it is in such situations that a particular mode of expression, such as 
this chart, can be of use. This way of representing simulations made explicit that there were 
different ways of valuing them. This is not a trivial achievement since it affects how the 
direction of a project is determined.  
In other discussions, however, different versions of the chart helped to interrogate and 
make explicit other aspects of simulation, such as issues of closure and open-endedness. This 
particular contrast is especially important in the encounter of modeling and ethnographic 
modes of research (Beaulieu, Scharnhorst and Wouters, 2007).  
In figure 7, we show a possible variations of our initial sketch, and suggest potential 
dimensions which might enter discussions of simulation in the course of building them. In 
presenting this sketch-turned-into-a-chart, we feel the tension between reifying how 
simulations should be understood, and offering our experience as a potentially powerful 
contribution to developing a more reflexive approach to simulation building.   
27	  
	  
 
Figure 7: Possible dimensions of simulations. Our chart focuses on two specific dimensions that were 
especially important in shaping debates in our own simulation -building project.  Several others have 
been identified in this paper, and many others can be imagined. 
	  
Our chart can be seen as an instance of pictures that simply ‘simulate a passage from a 
literary surface to a witnessable object or practical work space’ (Lynch, 1991: 18). We are 
aware that we undertake to spatialize our arguments—much in the same way that learning 
became something to be represented in a landscape. To deploy STS insights about the value 
of specifying criteria in the evaluation of knowledge, we transformed them into the idiom of 
our colleague simulation-builders. Representational features, such as labels, vectors, 
structural axes and boundaries, all contribute to creating different impressions, even in 
sociological figures (Lynch, 1991). The landscape enabled us to articulate not only 
differences between simulations, but also their potential co-existence. If nothing else, our use 
of a populated landscape to elaborate our arguments was successful in increasing the 
impression of relevance for our simulation-building audiences.  Our appeal to a visual 
rhetoric is motivated by pragmatic rather than scientistic aspirations, and we want to stress 
that the chart has worked best when used as a prop, as a starting point to be modified in the 
course of talking and sketching rather than as reified representation. 
experts	  
formal	  
explicit	  
micro	  
phenomenon	  
lay	  
informal	  
tacit	  
macro	   concept	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Simulation as Reduction, Representation and Intervention 
Simulations always involve selection and abstraction, no matter the composition of 
the team or the domain to which they are applied.  As a result of the analysis of simulation-
building presented here, however, we are in a position to make two important points in 
relation to concerns that the use of simulations carries the risk of embracing reductionism or 
positivism.  
First of all, we wish to point out that there may also be a risk involved in NOT doing 
this. Within anthropology, STS or other interpretative fields, ‘cultural and historical 
processes’, as well as human agency, are no less expressed in ‘idioms’ than when represented 
in simulations. By challenging our representations of ‘cultural and historical processes’, the 
competence project brought to light our investments in particular representations. For 
example, working on these simulations involved a number of clashes between expectations of 
‘delivering data’ and ‘pursuing fieldwork’. While these at first seemed like clashes between 
positivistic approaches and interpretative ones, prolonged discussions of these expectations 
and of ways of working clarified that the issue was rather both more specific and more 
fundamental than it seemed at first. In trying to incorporate ethnographic material into a 
simulation, we came to focus on and articulate the differences in the kinds of ‘closure’ that 
are achieved in physics and in ethnographic fieldwork, and on the radically different 
timeframes in which this occurs. Modeling could not begin without a description of a 
phenomenon, but, equally, fieldwork could not proceed without an open-ended view of what 
a phenomenon might be.6 By being involved in simulation-building, assumptions about 
fieldwork became explicit, because they were challenged by requests for particular kinds of 
representations of fieldwork. Friction between idioms reveals assumptions that remain 
invisible when sticking to overly familiar modes of representation. 
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As we see it, the risk for researchers working in interpretative traditions to engage 
with simulation-building, is also the risk of gaining a better understanding of what is gained 
and what is lost, of what we can possibly compromise of our usual ways of describing and 
representing, and what is non-negotiable. Given that simulations can play an important role in 
the representation of complex multi-causal phenomena, a class of systems of prime 
importance for the humanities (Hayles, 2005), we see this as a risk well worth taking. 
 Second, we also hope to have shown that simulation building is far from being a 
hegemonic ‘technical representation’, but rather a modulated set of representations which, in 
their diversity, allow for a moderately diverse range of encounters. Even in our small project 
team, many simulations were generated, each putting forth very different elements and 
highlighting different ways of knowing. Of course, part of the story we told also highlights 
that this range is limited in certain ways, and that there is a strong tendency to consider 
simulations according to particular hierarchies—in our case, ones that fit with an epistemic 
culture of physics. But this can only change as researchers from the social sciences engage in, 
develop, and influence simulation-building practices.  
 Our chart is proposed as a contribution to further facilitate and enhance such 
encounters. We suggest that this kind of representation can be a useful and potentially new 
kind of contribution of STS to scientific practice.  
Besides these developments, an enduring contribution of STS has been to make 
visible various kinds of work that are usually excluded from accounts of science. Our account 
contributes to this larger project by making visible the tensions and activities involved in 
combining roles as participant and analyst. Our role as both makers of simulations and as 
observers of our own project results in valuable and arguably unique insights, but it also 
requires close attention. For example, while our immersion in the processes of doing 
simulation gave us unparalleled access to the ongoing ‘messy’ practices involved in this 
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work, this immersion also generated particular attachments to our own sense of how the 
project progressed, and made it particularly difficult to ‘report’ on this work. We have 
attempted to maintain ‘epistemological reflexivity,’ one of the important contributions of 
ethnographic approaches to studies of scientific and technological processes (Forsythe, 1997), 
a practice that has taken the form of signalling compromises and tensions (also in the writing 
of this piece).      
The dual roles of analyst and participant are also increasingly played by STS scholars 
working with a mandate for intervention, in the course of constructive technology assessment 
exercises, or as part of large endeavors around genomics, nanotechnology or 
cyberinfrastructure.  Our hope is therefore that this article may contribute to document 
simulation-building as a practice, that the chart may be a concrete contribution to stimulate 
and focus discussions about ways of knowing, and that we may have demonstrated how STS 
insights can be deployed in the course of combining dual roles of participant and analyst.  
 
Notes 
The simulation-building work described in this manuscript was funded by the Federal 
Ministry for Education and Research (Germany) and the European Social Fund and while the 
work of Matt Ratto was funded by the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) 
through the project Dissimilar Simulation: the Epistemics of Simulation in the Humanities, in 
the framework program ‘Culturele vernieuwing en de grondslagen van de 
geesteswetenschappen’. We are grateful to the other members of the simulation project, to 
our colleagues for discussions on these matters, and to John Erpenbeck who encouraged us to 
work on the interactive aspect of the simulations. We would also like to thank the editors and 
reviewers, Marcel Boumans, Guenter Kueppers, Sabina Leonelli, Kyriaki Papageorgiou, as 
well as members of the Virtual Knowledge Studio for their detailed comments on earlier 
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versions of this article.   The simulations developed in this project can be found at 
http://evolino.virtualknowledgestudio.nl/english/files.html . 
1. In assessing the usefulness of simulations for social science, it is precisely the possibility 
that simulations can be ‘more’ than mathematical formulations that makes them appealing 
(Moretti, 2002).  
2. In particular, self-organization theories developed in physics frame this work (Nicolis & 
Prigogine, 1977, 1989; Feistel & Ebeling 1989). 
3. Uncertainty is important for two reasons. First, it makes explicit that learning often occurs 
in situations where the goal is shaped during the process (Erpenbeck & Heyse, 1999). 
Second, uncertainty is an implicit part of the ‘real world’ context in which competence is 
exercised, where, for example, the problem of unemployment and the need for flexible work 
forces remain major policy issues. 
4. However, it is important to make explicit that even in the case of the swarm simulation, 
some ‘massaging’ of the equations was required in order to make them work within the 
swarm software framework. This type of ‘articulation work’ (Strauss, 1988; Fujimura, 1987), 
often referred to as ‘tuning’, has been documented in other examples of mathematical 
modelling and simulation. (E.g. Kueppers & Lenhard, 2005; Winsberg, 2006).  
5. Actually, Evolino has turned out not to be particularly suitable for the kinds of model-
testing (e.g. the statistical analysis of high numbers of individual simulation ‘runs’,) that 
physicists and other simulation users often require for legitimacy. The computer language 
(shock wave flash) requires quite a lot of memory and as a web program does not allow the 
storage of results. The simulation therefore tends to crash if it runs for too long or too often. 
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6. This and other insights are detailed in another article (Beaulieu, Scharnhorst & Wouters, 
2007). 
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